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This paper tests the theory of opportunistic cycles in a decade-old democracy, Russia, 
finds strong evidence of cycles, and provides explanation for why previous literature 
often found weaker evidence. Using the comprehensive list of Russia's regional elections 
and regional monthly panel data between 1996 and 2003, we find that: (1) budget cycle is 
very sizable and short-lived: large expansion and contraction in fiscal spending occur 
within two months of elections on both sides; (2) the magnitude of the cycle decreases 
with government transparency, level of regional democracy, and voter awareness; (3) 
cycle becomes smaller over time; (4) pre-electoral manipulation increases incumbents’ 
chances for re-election. The results confirm theoretical findings that maturity of 
democracy, transparency, and voter awareness are important in determining the scope for 
opportunistic cycles. The short length of the cycle explains underestimation of its size by 
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1 “You can fool some of the people all of the time, and all of the 
people some of the time, but you cannot fool all of the people all of 
the time.”  
(Attributed to Abraham Lincoln, 1809-1865) 
1. Introduction 
Despite the fact that theoretical research on opportunistic political cycles is very 
intuitive and well developed, empirical literature produced mixed results in attempts to 
find convincing evidence of opportunistic cycles for almost a quarter of a century after 
pioneering work of Nordhaus (1975). The evidence from developed countries is 
particularly weak.
1 This apparent contradiction between the theory and evidence created 
an intellectual puzzle. Why did many tests fail? Should the theory or the empirics be held 
responsible? Motivated by this gap, several recent theoretical works argued that 
opportunistic cycles should be most sizable in countries with immature democratic 
regimes.
2 The evidence has been strongly supportive of this view: the cross-country 
comparisons with large presence of young democratic regimes and within-country studies 
of immature democracies have shown significant and robust fiscal cycles almost 
exclusively.
3 Many of the tests, however, suffer from data limitations, in particular, 
insufficient frequency and, often, too high level of aggregation.
4 This paper sheds further 
light on the puzzle by documenting very strong evidence of opportunistic cycles using 
detailed regional monthly panel data from a decade-old democracy. 
                                                 
1 See Alesina, Roubini, and Cohen (1997), Drazen (2000), Franzese (2002), and Brender and Drazen 
(2003) for detailed surveys of theoretical and empirical literatures. 
2 See, for instance, Gonzalez (2000) and Shi and Svensson (2002a). 
3 See evidence and discussion in Brender and Drazen (2003) as well as evidence produced by Gonzalez 
(2002), Krueger and Turan (1993), Drazen and Eslava (2003), Block (2001), Block, et al. (2001), Shi and 
Svensson (2002a), and Shi and Svensson (2002b). 
4 Drazen and Eslava (2003) show that, to identify the cycle, it may be important to look at the composition 
of the budget rather than the aggregate fiscal spending. 
  2According to the theory, asymmetric information, awareness, and immaturity of 
democracy magnify the size of opportunistic cycles.
5 Thus, the maximum possible size of 
the cycles should be observed in environments with these properties. Thus, Russia’s 
regional elections of executives provide an ideal case for an empirical test of 
opportunistic political cycle theory. First, Russian democracy is very young and many 
regions are notorious for governor’s control over mass media and large fraction of 
uninformed, naïve and myopic electorate. Second, detailed monthly regional-level data 
allow more powerful tests of the theory than the ones done so far. And third, high 
regional variation in possible determinants of cycles, on the one hand, and high 
uniformity in variables that are important to control for, i.e., electoral institutions, scope 
for policymaking, culture, trust, etc., on the other, help to analyze what drives variation in 
the magnitude of cycles.
6
We test for presence of political cycles in Russian regional elections in a wide 
range of fiscal policy instruments as well as economic outcomes. Then, we address the 
question of how awareness of voters, their access to unbiased information, maturity of 
democracy, and voter experience affect cycle magnitude. Finally, we study whether 
opportunistic cycles help governors to get reelected. 
We find cycles in regional fiscal policies controlling for region-specific 
characteristics, federal trend, seasonality, and fluctuations driven by differences in 
ideology (partisan cycles).
7 Total budgetary expenditures, spending on education, 
healthcare, social disbursements, industrial subsidies, and mass media as well as 
repayments of wage arrears to public workers exhibit sizable and very short cyclical 
                                                 
5 Rogoff and Sibert (1988), Rogoff (1990), Gonzalez (2000), and Shi and Svensson (2002a). 
6 Persson and Tabellini (2003) show that electoral institutions are important determinants of cycles. 
7 See Alesina, Roubini, and Cohen (1997) for a review of partisan cycles. 
  3pattern. The biggest in magnitude cycles are observed in repayment of wage arrears and 
social expenditures. Even though spending starts to grow gradually approximately nine to 
six months before elections, the largest (significant) jump takes place one or two months 
before elections. Right after elections spending drops and wage arrears start to 
accumulate. Industrial growth is not significantly affected by elections in line with the 
empirical literature and in contrast to predictions of the first wave of non-rational 
Keynesian-style opportunistic models (Nordhaus, 1975). 
Use of monthly panel data allowed us careful measurement of even very short 
cycles. This turned out to be important because most sizable increases in spending 
happen a month before and decreases a month after elections, thus, use of lower 
frequency data would have lead to substantial underestimation of cycles. To the best of 
our knowledge all empirical studies on developing countries so far used quarterly or 
lower frequency data. Very short cycles, however, cannot be clearly seen in quarterly 
data because elections often take place in the middle of the quarter and the opposite-sign 
deviations from the trend around elections cancel out in data with low frequency.
8 It is 
important to note that the short length of the cycle does not mean that the cycles are not 
of any quantitative importance. First, poor voters who are the primary target of the cycle 
(public workers on budget payroll and recipients social disbursements) have the worst 
possibilities for consumption smoothing. Second, irrespective of the driving force of the 
cycle - asymmetric information or voter inexperience (myopia) – it indicates the absence 
of checks and balances on politicians common in mature democracies (i.e., separation of 
powers, free media, active NGOs, etc.) that give voters fuller information and longer-
                                                 
8 The only paper that uses monthly data is Berger and Voitek (1997). They reject hypothesis of 
opportunistic cycles for the German developed democracy.  
  4term control over politicians and, therefore, limit possibilities for misuse of public office 
for private gain. Thus, large and short-lived cycles provide evidence of poor long-term 
accountability of politicians. 
What determines the magnitude of cycles? In line with the latest theoretical 
findings of the literature, we find that proxies for informational symmetry (freedom of 
media and transparency of regional governments), voter awareness (education level and 
urbanization) as well as the level of regional democracy significantly reduce cycles. In 
addition, cycles get smaller over time, which could be an indication of voter learning as 
Russia’s democracy matures or an effect of the change of president (data are insufficient 
to distinguish between these two hypotheses). We also find that cycles in fiscal policy 
instruments significantly increase popularity of incumbents and help them win. Our 
results suggest that maturity of democracy is a very important factor determining the 
scope for effective use of political cycles: it pays in young democracies and it does not in 
the environments with high voter awareness and developed democratic institutions.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section briefly 
overviews the findings of previous literature. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 
formulates hypotheses and empirical methodology. Section 5 presents the results. Section 
6 concludes. 
2. Previous literature 
Two strands of literature, opportunistic political business cycles and partisan 
theory, explain inefficient economic fluctuations around elections. The literature on 
opportunistic cycles argues that electoral pressure forces politicians to manipulate public 
policy in order to increase chances of reelection with the help of pre-electoral 
  5improvements. Low asymmetry of information between politicians and the public, 
awareness of voters, availability of institutional checks and balances, and maturity of 
democracy reduce opportunistic cycles. The alternative approach – partisan theory – 
argues that policies are predetermined by ideology. Economic fluctuations arise as a 
result of policy changes when different parties alternate in office: each party in office 
focuses on the short run improvements for its own constituency.
9
Kalecki (1943) was the first to develop the idea that politicians might alter 
policies in the face of elections. Subsequently, theory of opportunistic cycles and partisan 
theory developed in parallel. The theoretical literature came in two waves. The first “non-
rational” wave came in 1970s. Nordhaus (1975) built the first opportunistic model based 
on adaptive expectations of voters. Hibbs (1977) developed the first partisan model. Frey 
(1978) and Frey and Schneider (1978) combined the features of opportunistic theory and 
partisan theory to develop weak partisan theory. The second wave reconciled rational 
expectations with political cycles. Alesina (1987) built the rational partisan theory that 
attributed cycles to wage rigidities and uncertainty of election’s outcome. Rogoff and 
Sibert (1988), Rogoff (1990), and Persson and Tabellini (1990) modeled rational 
opportunistic cycles that are based on asymmetry of information between the incumbent 
politician and the voters. Adaptive expectations models exploited the Phillips curve 
framework and, thus, predicted cycles in growth, unemployment, and inflation. 
Opportunistic models based on rational expectations predicted cyclical pattern in fiscal 
policies rather than real outcomes.
10 Recently, Gonzalez (2000) extended the rational 
                                                 
9 Binding commitments to co-operative common policy rule and reputation reduce partisan cycles. 
10 Keller and May (1984) were the first to argue that one needs to look at the political actions rather than 
the real economic outcomes to find evidence of opportunistic cycles based on analysis of President Nixon’s 
election campaign. Overall, pure (non-rational) theories à la Nordhaus (1975) and Hibbs (1977) are proven 
  6signaling models to accommodate importance of the institutional context of 
policymaking: transparency and maturity of democratic traditions. Shi and Svensson 
(2002a) modeled the effect of a change in a fraction of uniformed voters on the 
magnitude of rational cycles in a moral hazard framework. 
  Empirical research in developed countries so far revealed much stronger evidence 
of partisan compared to opportunistic cycles. Using quarterly post-war US data, Alesina 
and Sachs (1988) found strong support for rational partisan theory and Klein (1996) little 
support for opportunistic cycles. Berger and Woitek (1997) rejected both partisan and 
opportunistic cycles in Germany on monthly data. Reid (1997) relaxed the assumption of 
exogeneity of election time and found weak evidence of opportunistic cycles in Canadian 
provinces. Alesina and Roubini (1992) tested the competing theories in a unified 
framework, using panel of 18 OECD countries with quarterly data, and found strong 
robust support of rational partisan cycles and, in selected countries, some evidence of 
rational opportunistic cycles. 
Non-convincing evidence of opportunistic cycles in developed countries 
motivated the new wave of empirical research that uses data from developing countries 
with an emphasis on the determinants of cycles. Schuknecht (1998, 2000) found evidence 
of cycles in budget expenditures and investment based on quarterly panel data for 25 
developing countries and showed that cycles are much larger in countries with low 
inflation costs. Block (2001) used annual data for 69 developing countries to show that 
budget cycles took place only in countries with sufficient electoral competition. Block, et 
al. (2001) confirmed this result on data for 44 African countries. In addition, they found 
                                                                                                                                                 
to be inconsistent with results of virtually all empirical tests: Drazen (2000) surveys empirical literature to 
show that, when found, cycles affect fiscal and monetary policies rather than growth or unemployment. 
  7that cycles got weaker as voters learned. Gonzalez (2002) found evidence of budget 
cycles in Mexico and showed that they are related to the levels of democracy and 
transparency. Shi and Svensson (2002b) analyzed data from 123 countries and found 
some evidence of cycles both in developed and developing countries with significantly 
stronger evidence in developing countries. Persson and Tabellini (2003) also provided 
evidence of budget cycles both in developed and developing countries. Subsequent work 
of Brender and Drazen (2003) showed that the evidence of cycles in developed countries 
is unrobust and depends on few influential observations, whereas evidence from 
developing countries is driven by immature democracies. 
Overall, recent research with the focus on fiscal instruments in young democracies 
produced more convincing evidence of opportunistic cycles. This evidence, however, is 
not always as strong as one could expect. Important reason for this is underestimation of 
the cycle due to insufficient frequency of data; we address this problem in this paper.  
3. The data 
 
The comprehensive list of regional governor elections that took place and will 
take place in Russia between August 1995 and December 2003 consists of 194 electoral 
events.
11 Data on most policy instruments and outcomes are available for 159 elections 
that took place in the period between September 1996 and July 2003. Four regions had 
three rounds of elections, sixty-five regions had two rounds of elections, and seventeen 
regions had just one round of elections during this period. The source of data on elections 
is Tsentrizbirkom, the Central Elections Committee of the Russian Federation.  
                                                 
11 This list covers all the regions but Dagestan, the only region where the governor is appointed. We also 
excluded data for Chechnya and Ingushetia from our sample because the fluctuations in fiscal policies of 
these regions have been driven by war rather than elections. 
  8Regional monthly series of fiscal instruments and outcomes come from two 
sources:  Goskomstat, the State Committee of Statistics, provided data on wages and 
income, wage arrears from the regional budgets, price level, and industrial output 
between 1995 and 2003; the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation provided 
detailed data on execution of regional budgets for the period between 1996 and 2003.  
To test for the determinants of cycle magnitude, we use cross-section data. Data 
on urbanization and education come from Goskomstat. The data on freedom of media in 
the regions were provided by the Institute of Free Media (www.freepress.ru). Data on 
transparency of the regional government come from “Media-Soyuz,” an independent 
professional association of Russian journalists. Data on the scope of regional democracy 
are from Nikolay Petrov of the Carnegie Moscow Center, Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace (Petrov, 2001). Appendix presents descriptive statistics of the data. In 
many cases, simple plots of actual series of regional spending suggest vivid increases in 
spending prior to elections (some examples are given in figure 1). One of the tasks of this 
paper is to find out if the results of a “visual test” survive rigorous econometric analysis. 
4. Hypotheses and empirical methodology 
4.1. Test of opportunistic cycles 
Theory of opportunistic cycles predicts that governors pursue expansionary fiscal 
and/or monetary policies before elections irrespective of their ideological platform. We 
test whether these predictions are consistent with the data treating election time as 
exogenous.
12
                                                 
12 Reid (1997) and Heckelman and Berument (1998) pointed out that opportunistic cycles can also occur as 
a result of setting election date at a time of a boom. Although almost 19% of Russia’s regional elections 
happened a month or more of their expected date; in vast majority of these cases, however, the time was 
  9  To test the existence of cycles and analyze their duration, we utilize the event 
study methodology. The following specification of panel regressions with regional fixed-
effects was used: 
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where i – region; t – ordinal number of a particular month. y stands for a de-trended 
monthly instrument or outcome of regional policy.
13 We consider three groups of policy 
instruments and outcomes: budgetary expenditures (total budgetary expenditures as well 
as levels and shares of expenditures on social programs, education, culture, healthcare, 
mass media, and subsidies to industry and agriculture), budgetary revenues and deficit 
(total budgetary revenues, tax revenues, federal transfers, and deficit)
14 and such 
outcomes as growth, inflation, regional wage arrears, wage level, and money income. 
mjit is a dummy that equals 1, if t is j months away from elections in region i 
(negative j means that t is prior to elections, positive – that t is after elections, j=0 in the 
month of elections). Significant coefficients at dummies indicating the time distance from 
elections (αj) point toward the shifts in the autocorrelation process of the policy 
instrument. Thus, positive significant values of the estimates of αj before elections and 
negative significant values of the estimates of αj after elections would serve as evidence 
of the opportunistic political cycle. 
                                                                                                                                                 
shifted exogenously, because governors were promoted to the federal government before their terms ended. 
It is illegal to shift the date of regional elections in Russia. There were few cases, however, when there was 
no exogenous reason for the shift of election time. To make sure that our results are not driven by presence 
of endogenous elections, we repeated all tests on the subsample of elections that had exogenously pre-
determined timing and got virtually identical results. 
13 The detailed description of how the policy instruments were de-trended is presented below in this 
section. 
14 We look at the federal transfers conditional on them being positive.  
  10Term controls for incumbent’s political horizon.
15 It equals 0, 1, 2, or 3 depending 
on which term the governor serves in office; 0 indicates that the governor is appointed 
and has not been elected before; 1 indicates that the governor was elected for the first 
time, etc.  fi are regional fixed effects.
16
) ln( j it y − ,  { } 4 ; 1 ∈ j  account for autocorrelation in the series of policy instruments. 
We tested the optimal lag structure of the model using Akaike criterion. Inclusion of four 
lags turned out to be optimal in terms of fit for the vast majority of the series.
17 Lags in 
panel regressions may bias the estimators (Hansen, 1982 and White, 1982). The bias 
converges to zero when time dimension of a panel goes to infinity. Our monthly panel 
covers above eighty months (seven years). Therefore, the asymptotic properties can be 
applied. Nonetheless, we re-estimated equation (1) using the Arellano-Bond procedure 
(Arellano and Bond, 1991). The results were not changed by this technique. 
Electoral campaign platforms of Russia’s governors are polarized into the 
“communist left” and the “liberal-democratic ideology.” Left is a dummy that equals 1 if 
the incumbent governor is supported by the Communist Left wing coalition. This dummy 
controls for partisan cycles.
18  
An important methodological question is how to control for the macroeconomic 
shocks and the federal policy that affect regions. In particular, this is essential, because in 
                                                 
15 Besley and Case (1995) built a theoretical model and provided empirical evidence that gubernatorial term 
limits are an important determinant of fiscal policies. 
16 The regression has a constant term because fi’s joint mean is normalized to zero. 
17 The results are robust to using higher order lag polynomials and to the use of other criteria of auto-
regressive-model selection. For the sake of uniformity, we report results with four lags for all the series, but 
results do not change if we include optimal number of lags determined separately for each of the series. 
18 Partisan theory implicates a priori differences in ideology: “communist left” ideology opts for a larger 
size of government and larger redistribution. This implies that, ceteris paribus, social expenditures, 
government deficit, and inflation should be greater if communist governors are in power. In practice, the 
variation in the data is insufficient to have a proper test of partisan theory because there are only few cases 
when new governor of the opposite ideological platform replaced an incumbent governor after elections; 
and, therefore, ideology of governors is almost perfectly collinear with regional fixed effects. Thus, we do 
not put emphasis on interpretation of coefficient of the “left-wing” dummy. 
  111996 at one instance several regional elections and the federal elections took place in 
Russia. In order to eliminate the effects of the federal policy (which can also be cyclical 
in the face of federal elections) we tried each of the three following options (used by 
Alesina and Roubini, 1992). First, we divided each policy instrument by its federal level 
(calculated as population-weighted average of the regional values). Second, we added 
federal trend as regressor. Third, we added month dummies as regressors. The results of 
these three approaches are very similar, thus, throughout the paper we use specification 
of the first approach: all considered policy instruments and outcomes are de-trended. 
Another methodological question is how to control for seasonal fluctuations. It is 
important because a large portion of regional elections had taken place in the same 
months (elections frequently took place at the end of the year, particularly, in December). 
We tried the following alternative strategies. First, to control for the common to all 
regions seasonal fluctuations, it is sufficient to include dummies for calendar month in 
the regression or de-trend as described in the previous paragraph. Second, to control for 
region-specific seasonality, we included fixed effects for each of the region-month 
combinations (86 regions times 12 calendar months) in equation (1). Each strategy 
produced very similar results in magnitude with a slight loss of significance in the latter 
case due to a considerable fall in the number of degrees of freedom. As a baseline, we 
report regression results that control for common to all regions seasonality. 
4.2. Determinants of opportunistic cycles 
The second step of our analysis is the study of the determinants of cycle 
magnitude. We test the predictions of the theory that the size of opportunistic cycles is 
negatively related to awareness of voters, access to unbiased sources of information, and 
  12the maturity of democracy (Rogoff and Sibert, 1988, Gonzalez, 2000, and Shi and 
Svensson, 2002a). 
The best way to test for the determinants of the magnitude of the cycle is to run 
specification (1) with additional regressors that proxy for possible determinants of the 
cycle - awareness, democracy, and government transparency (Ri) and voter learning 




19 We use the following measures of awareness: the log share of population 
with higher education and the log share of urban population. As proxies for government 
transparency (informational asymmetry) we use indices of freedom of media production 
in the region and transparency of regional government. We also look at the effect of the 
level of regional democracy. All these measures are available only as cross-section.
20 We 
run the full panel with 12 month dummies before and after elections (analogous to (1)), 
but for the presentation purposes we report a shorter version that preserves the main 
results from the longer specification: 
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As yit, we used only fiscal policy instruments, since they turned out to exhibit 
significant cycles after estimation of equation (1). Negative significant coefficients at 
 and   are interpreted as evidence that awareness, democracy, government  i jitR m t jitTime m
                                                 
19 Henceforth, in addition to using Time as a proxy for learning, we consider the number of previous 
elections in a particular region (we call this variable Round). These two proxies are correlated. 
20 All of these measures (education, urbanization, freedom of media, government transparency, and 
democracy) are positively correlated with each other. All correlations are highly significant except for the 
correlation between education level, on the one hand, and democracy and government transparency, on the 
other. Proxies for voter awareness reflect both the possibilities of electorate to get access to necessary 
information (i.e., internet and TV) which is easier in urban areas as well as the ability (experience) of 
electorate to process this information that comes with education level. 
  13transparency, and voter experience are associated with lower amplitude of the cycle 
(given that coefficients at respective   are positive).  jit m
The fact that Ri does not vary across time and for four of the five measures varies 
only a little across regions (summary statistics are provided in appendix) creates a 
problem in estimation of this panel because regressors   and   are correlated. 
Thus, to make sure that our results are not driven by this correlation we also report the 
results of the following cross-section test. 
i jitR m jit m
As a cross-section measure of the magnitude of the cycle in a particular fiscal 
policy instrument for a particular election, we take the pre-electoral month deviation of 
the value of that policy instrument from the regional trend net of seasonal fluctuations. 
Thus, we define cycle amplitudes as pre-electoral month residuals from estimation of the 
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dmjt in equation (2) stands for month dummies corresponding to 12 calendar months. 
Timet  is the real time in months. Summary statistics for each individual proxy of the 
amplitude are presented in table 1. For all fiscal policy instruments, the mean amplitudes 
are positive and, for nine out of twelve, they are significantly different from zero. In 
addition to considering the amplitudes in each budgetary item separately, we constructed 
an aggregate measure of magnitude as the first principal component of the amplitudes in 
individual fiscal policies with the most profound electoral cycle, viz., total budgetary 
  14expenditures, social expenditures, expenditures on culture, education, mass media, and 
regional industrial subsidies.
21
To examine which factors influence the magnitude of the cycles, we run the 
following equation on the pooled cross section of elections: 
i i i i Time R A ε β β β + + + = 2 1 0        ( 3 )  
where i is the ordinal number of elections. Ai is the amplitude of the cycle (as described 
above).  Ri is a proxy for awareness, democracy, and government transparency (as 
above).
22  Timei is a proxy for voter experience measured in years. In estimation of 
equation (3), we excluded elections that took place in 9 Autonomous Okrugs that are 
subdivisions of other larger regions because for the most part Ri data are unavailable for 
them. Equation (3) has regional-level regressors; thus, we allow error terms to be 
clustered (correlated) among observations within the same regions. 
Learning by voters is not the only possible interpretation of the negative influence 
of Time on the magnitude of the cycle, however. An alternative story is the disciplining 
role of increased central control over regions during Putin’s compared to Yeltsin’s 
administration. Although, there has not been any formal institutional change in the 
regional electoral mechanism or authority of regional governments over spending from 
Yeltsin’s to Putin’s time, one could argue that Putin has monitored regional governments 
                                                 
21 The first principal component explains 47% of the total variation in these measures. The factor loadings 
are as follows: 0.73 (Total Budget Expenditures) + 0.59 (Social Expenditures) + 0.74 (Expenditures on 
Culture) + 0.80 (Education Expenditures) + 0.42 (Media Expenditures) + 0.21 (Expenditures on Industry). 
22 In cross-section regressions, instead of the entire index of democracy, we use dummy that indicates if a 
region has a value of democracy that is above the median (this proxy gives us better fit, possibly because of 
poor cardinal properties of the index). 
  15more closely. In attempt to separate these hypotheses we run regressions (1`) and (3) 
separately for periods when each of the presidents was in power.
23
4.3. Do cycles help wining? 
Finally, we investigate whether it pays to pursue cyclical policies.
24 To test 
whether cycles helped incumbent governors to get re-elected, we estimate how the 
probability to win and the share of incumbents’ votes depend on the amplitude of the 
cycles, controlling for the ideology of incumbent governor and governor’s performance 
in the last term. We also test if the effect of cycles on the probability to win depends on 
awareness, democracy, and learning. We estimate the following equations on the pooled 
cross section of elections: 
i i i i i i i i i i i R Perform Time Left Time Time A A A A R R A P ε γ γ γ γ γ γ γ γ + + + + + − − + − − + + = 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 ) )( ( ) )( ( ) ln(     (4) 
and 
Prob{incumbent - below the 2
nd place; incumbent - the 1
st runner up; incumbent wins}i= 
i i i i i i i i i i R Perform Time Left Time Time A A A A R R A ε φ φ φ φ φ φ φ φγ + + + + + − − + − − + + = 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 ) )( ( ) )( (     (5) 
where Pi is the popularity of incumbent measured by the ratio of votes for incumbent to 
votes for the most popular challenger on elections i. Ai is the proxy for the aggregate 
amplitude of the cycles prior to elections i, equal to the first principal component of the 
amplitudes of fiscal policies as in equation (3). The cross-terms  ) )( ( A A R R i i − −  and 
) )( ( Time Time A A i i − −  are included to test whether awareness, democracy, transparency, 
                                                 
23 If Time does have an effect within subsamples, one could argue that learning takes place. If, however, 
Time comes out insignificant, we cannot differentiate between the two hypotheses because insignificance of 
time within subsamples could be attributed to clustering of election dates or reduction in the number of 
observations. 
24 Russia’s incumbent governors have been active in trying to retain power (90% of them ran for re-
election) and they have been more successful than the opposition in attaining votes (65% of those who ran 
for another term won). This proportion is significantly larger than a half at 1% significance level.  This 
incumbency bias is quite high considering deep recession that Russia experienced for a large part of 
transition. 
  16and learning reduce effectiveness of cycles.
25 Positive significant coefficient at Ai is an 
indication that cycles help incumbents to get reelected (in line with opportunistic political 
cycle theories); negative significant coefficients at cross-terms indicate that Ri and Timei 
reduce the influence of cycles on chances of reelection. Control variables are as follows: 
Lefti is as described above. Performi is a vector of proxies for governor’s performance in 
the last term comprised of the differences between the overall regional means and the 
regional means over the last term for the following variables: log share of social 
expenditures, log of per capita regional product and log of price level.
26
Equation (5) is the multivariate ordered probit model with the same set of 
regressors as in (4) and with three outcomes for the incumbent: wins, is the first runner 
up, is below the second place.
27 In estimation of equations (4) and (5), from the sample 
we exclude elections with the single candidate, elections, in which incumbent did not run 
for reelection and did not name his successor, and (as above) elections in Autonomous 
Okrugs. In addition, we used Cook’s distance approach (Cook, 1977) to exclude four 
outliers that had excessively strong effect on our estimates. Just as in equation (3), in 
equations (4) and (5) we allow error terms to be clustered within regions. 
There is an endogeneity problem in estimation of equations (4) and (5), however. 
If governors are sure of wining because their rating is too high, they have weak incentives 
to use cyclical policy because of the costs of pre-electoral distortions. In this case, the 
                                                 
25 Upper bars denote the mean values. Subtraction of means before taking the cross-term does not change 
the interpretation of the coefficient at the cross-term, but makes the interpretation of the coefficients of Ai 
easier: it becomes equal to the full effect of the amplitude, evaluated at  R and Time.  
26 There are a number of additional proxies that we used to control for governor’s performance (as a 
robustness check), i.e. relative income, relative taxation level, and relative growth rate in all of the 
performance indicators considered. The main results do not depend on the choice of controls for past 
governor’s performance. 
27 We also estimate simple probit model with two outcomes: wins/loses. Both approaches produce almost 
identical results. 
  17tighter the electoral competition, the higher the incentives for pre-electoral manipulations. 
This link from popularity to incentives for cyclical behavior implies negative correlation 
between popularity and cycles. Thus, if there are governors that are sure of re-election, 
we are likely to underestimate a positive causal relationship between the magnitude of the 
cycles and the probability to win with regressions (4) and (5).
28 One could argue that too 
low probability to win may also reduce incentives for cyclical policy because expected 
gains from elections are lower than costs of distortions in this case. This would have 
implied that we overestimate the causal effect of cycles on popularity. There have not, 
however, been regional elections so far in Russia where incumbent governors did not 
have a good chance of wining.
29 Therefore, overall we are likely to underestimate the 
effect.  
5. Results 
5.1. Evidence of cycles 
The results of estimation of equation (1) are presented in tables 2 and 3. Table 2 
presents regression results for fiscal policy instruments. Figure 2 presents predicted by 
these results political budget cycle for a number of budgetary items measured in 
percentage deviations from the trend around elections. Total budgetary expenditures 
experience the first significant jump up of 5% that takes place only three months before 
elections (prior to that coefficients are mostly positive, but insignificant); the next rise in 
expenditures of 9% happens one month before elections. The total increase in the budget 
                                                 
28 Cook’s distance approach (Cook, 1977) eliminated observations in which incumbents had the highest 
political rating. Therefore, it partly eliminated this problem. 
29 In order to make sure that we do not overestimate the effect of cycles on probability to get re-elected we 
re-estimated the equations (4) and (5) on the subsample of elections prior to which incumbent was at least 
twice as popular as the main opponent and got similar results. Instrumenting the amplitude is the way to 
solve this problem altogether, but we do not have a good instrument. 
  18spending during the year prior to elections amounts to 13%.
30 The election month and the 
month right after the elections are characterized by significant decreases in total budget 
expenditures (the total decrease in these two months amounts to 17%). We do not find 
significant changes in total expenditures after two month following elections. Budgetary 
expenditures on education, culture, and healthcare follow a similar pattern: All three 
expenditure items exhibit significant increases in the two months prior to elections: of 13, 
11, and 11%, respectively. These expenditure items fall significantly by 13, 19, and 12%, 
respectively, during the two months right after elections.
31
Cycle in social spending item is more gradual: it rises significantly by 6.1% nine 
months before elections and, then, jumps up each month prior to elections starting five 
months before elections. During the month right before elections alone social 
expenditures rise by 18%. Accumulated growth in social expenditure over a half a year 
before elections amounts to 34%. Social expenditures do not drop below the overall trend 
as other expenditure items do after the elections: there is only one significant drop of 
23% one month after elections. 
Expenditures on industry (e.g., industrial subsidies) first rise significantly by 12% 
nine months before elections and, then, rise significantly for two months prior to 
elections. The total increase in industrial subsidies in the two months before elections 
amounts to 28%. During two months following elections industrial subsidies fall by 32%. 
Cyclical dynamics in social expenditures and industrial subsidies is supported by 
the intensive use of mass media. Expenditures on media exhibit first jump of 17% ten 
months before elections. Growth continues closer to elections: media spending increases 
                                                 
30 Henceforth, cumulative changes are calculated by comparisons of fitted values (see figure 2 for the 
illustration). 
31 11 and 10 months prior to elections education expenditures exhibit fluctuations that cancel each other 
out. 
  19by 30% during half a year preceding elections. This spending item drops 35% in the two 
post-electoral months. 
Investigation of pre-electoral dynamics in composition of budget spending shows 
that changes in social and media expenditures and industrial subsidies are 
disproportionately large compared to the other expenditure items. Share of social 
expenditures in total spending rises by 19% during the half a year prior to elections. 
Share of media expenditures jumps by 22% during the same period. In the pre-electoral 
month, shares of spending on social disbursements, media, and industrial subsidies reach 
the levels that are 18, 20, and 14% higher than their levels during times away from 
elections. 
The rise in expenditures is financed in part by increases in non-tax and tax 
revenues, in part by an increase in deficit and (for regions-recipients of federal grants) in 
part by increased federal transfers. Total revenues exhibit an increase of about 5% in the 
pre-election month and a drop of 14% in the month of elections. Interestingly, federal 
transfers finance a significant chunk of pre-electoral manipulations: they rise by 16% one 
month before elections; then, fall approximately by about 28% right after the elections. 
Table 3 presents the effect of elections on dynamics of economic outcomes and 
wage arrears. Regional growth does not exhibit a significant cyclical pattern. Inflation 
decreases throughout the half a year prior to elections (statistically significant drops in 
inflation take place in months -6, -4, -1, and 0). After the elections there is no statistically 
significant movement in inflation till month 11, when it increases.
32 These two pieces of 
evidence indicate that politicians do not explore growth-inflation tradeoff to increase 
their chances of reelection, contrary to Nordhaus’s prediction. Although these changes in 
                                                 
32 Unemployment behaves similarly to growth. 
  20inflation are econometrically significant, they are much smaller in magnitude than 
fluctuations in fiscal policy instruments. Thus, our fiscal policy cycles results hold 
irrespective of whether we take real or nominal values of the policy instruments.
33 Money 
income falls slightly in the middle of the year before elections, but grows in three pre-
electoral months, the total growth amounts to about 9%. Wage level exhibits small 
significant jumps four months before elections and in the pre-electoral month (as a result, 
in the pre-electoral month it is 2% above the trend) and falls consistently for seven 
months after elections (only coefficient at dummy three months after elections is 
significant, however). The effect of elections on average wage and income seems to be 
driven by repayment of wage arrears to public workers from the regional budgets (and, 
thus, to the budget cycle): wage arrears from regional budgets significantly decline 
(almost) every month during the last ten months before elections. Wage arrears drop by 
25% in the pre-election month alone. The total decline in the level of wage arrears 
amounts to 52% during the year prior to elections: a year before elections wage arrears 
are at the level that is 39% above the trend and by the pre-election month they reach the 
level that is 13% below the trend. 
Overall, we find very strong evidence of sizable opportunistic cycles in fiscal 
policies and no evidence of pre-electoral expansion in economic growth. Wage arrears 
repayments and social expenditures are the main instruments of fiscal pre-electoral 
manipulations. Cycles are very short: the largest shifts in policy instruments occur within 
a month or two from the election date. 
5.2. Evidence on determinants of cycle magnitude 
                                                 
33 As a baseline, we report dynamics of real values of policy instruments. We, however, also tested for 
presence of cycles in nominal expenditures directly (disregarding the price differences between regions). 
The results remained the same. 
  21Let us turn to the discussion of determinants of the size of cycles. Table 4 presents 
cross-section results (estimation of equation (3)). First, the data confirm the theoretical 
prediction that awareness of voters (measured by education and urbanization) reduces 
magnitude of the budget cycle. In all regressions, coefficients of proxies for awareness 
have the right sign. In eight out of twelve cases results are significant. Education and 
urbanization negatively significantly affect the aggregate measure of cycle magnitude. In 
addition, share of educated population significantly reduces cycles in education, cultural, 
and healthcare expenditures: A 10% increase in the share of population with higher 
education decreases cycle magnitude by almost 2%. Urbanization significantly affects 
cycles in total, social, and cultural expenditures: A 10% increase in the share of urban 
population leads to a decrease in the amplitude of cycle in total spending and spending on 
culture of about 2% and in social spending of 5%.  
Second, in line with prediction of Gonzalez (2000) that in the intermediate range 
of democracy levels, lack of democracy is what gives rise to election cycle (whenever 
democracy and transparency are related), we find that the magnitudes of the aggregate 
cycle as well as cycles in social and cultural expenditures are significantly smaller in 
more democratic regions. (Again, the effect of democracy has the right sign in all 
regressions.) The difference in magnitudes of cycles in social and cultural expenditures 
between regions with the levels of democracy above and below median is about one 
percent. Transparency of the government also significantly reduces cycles. A one 
standard deviation increase in the index of government transparency decreases cycles in 
social expenditures by 7 percent. A one standard deviation increase in the index of 
freedom of media leads to an 8% decrease in social expenditure cycle and a 5% decrease 
in cycle in cultural expenditures. Again, in vast majority of cases (7 out of 12), 
  22coefficients of proxies for government transparency have the predicted sign; in the other 
three cases, the effect is essentially zero. 
Overall, panel results (from estimation of equation (1`)) confirm the cross-section 
findings and, actually, in many cases, they are stronger. Table 5 presents panel results for 
healthcare expenditures, social expenditures, and the share of social expenditures (results 
for other fiscal policy instruments are very similar). The interaction terms of awareness, 
democracy, and transparency with pre-electoral month dummies usually have negative 
(often, significant) coefficients for the two months before elections indicating that these 
variables reduce the magnitude of the cycle.
34
Time, our proxy for learning, also negatively significantly affects the size of the 
cycle both in cross-section (table 4) and panel (table 5) specifications. As shown in table 
4, cycles fade away relatively fast: Each additional year on average decreases cycle 
magnitude by about 3%. We also estimated the effect of an additional round of regional 
elections as was done by Block, et al. (2001): An additional election in a region reduces 
the magnitude of the cycles by over 30%.
35 Thus, each new wave of regional elections 
had substantially smaller cycles.
36 When we split the sample into two subsamples 
according to the change of presidents (from Yeltsin to Putin), both the cross-section and 
panel results that the time (and the round of elections) reduces the magnitude of cycle 
                                                 
34 These results are robust to the number of pre-electoral dummies considered. They are also robust to 
accounting for Ri and time influence in one specification or in the separate specifications. 
35 The estimated cross-section equation of the influence of the round of elections in a region on the 
amplitude of the cycle is as follows: i i i i Left Round A ε + − − =
[1.04] [3.34] [3.19]
0.159 0.401 0.838 . (Number of observations 
is 133; R
2=0.085.) Time in our opinion, however, is a more appropriate measure of voter learning because 
voters can learn from other electoral events like elections to the regional legislature and federal elections. 
36 One could suppose that the magnitude of the cycle would be affected by the level of the world price of 
oil because in times of high oil prices, governors may be less constrained in their pre-electoral fiscal 
manipulations. (A large chunk of budgetary revenues at all levels of government directly and indirectly 
depends on taxation of oil rents.) As a robustness check, we have controlled for the level of oil price in all 
regressions and for its interaction with the pre-electoral month dummies in panel regressions and found that 
none of our baseline results are driven by the dynamics of oil prices. 
 
  23become much weaker and, in most cases, disappear (there are few fiscal instruments for 
which the results remain strong, however). Indeed, most of the variation in time 
component of the cycle magnitude comes from comparison of the two waves of elections: 
where the first wave came under Yeltsin’s administration and the second wave – under 
Putin’s. Thus, we cannot clearly separate the two hypotheses about whether time reflects 
learning or informal changes in Russia’s federal control over regions. 
5.3. Effect of cycles on re-election 
Table 6 presents the results of the test of whether cycles help to get reelected 
(estimation of equations (4) and (5)). We find strong evidence of political benefits of 
cyclical policies: ceteris paribus, an increase in magnitude of the fiscal policy cycle 
significantly affects the political rating of an incumbent governor and the probability of 
re-election. A 10% increase in the magnitude of the cycle leads to growth in incumbents’ 
popularity of 3.5%. We should emphasize that we most probably underestimate the effect 
of the cycles on chances to get re-elected because of possible endogeneity (discussed in 
the methodology section) and because we assumed the same mix of fiscal policy 
instruments for the measure of magnitude across regions.
37 Cross-terms are insignificant 
in all regressions, except for the cross-terms of the cycle amplitude with freedom of 
media and with democracy. They have negative significant coefficients in regressions 
explaining incumbent’s popularity. Thus, as democracy matures and press becomes more 
                                                 
37 Based on the case of the four federal elections in Russia, Treisman and Gimpelson (2001) argued that 
traditional empirical approach underestimates opportunistic cycles because it considers policy instruments 
separately, whereas, politicians change them from one election to another depending on political 
environment. Large samples, however, should allow observing opportunistic cycles in each policy 
instrument separately despite this underestimation. 




In this paper we tested for existence of opportunistic political cycles and studied 
whether voter awareness, maturity of democracy, transparency of government, and 
learning affect cycles. We also examined if cycles increase governors’ chances to get 
reelected and whether this effect depends on awareness, democracy, and transparency. 
The monthly regional panel data allowed us to define timing of the cycle more precisely 
than it has been previously done in the literature. 
We found strong evidence that: 
1) Opportunistic political cycles in budgetary spending have taken place in Russian 
regions in the period between 1996 and 2003. Most sizable cyclical changes happen 
within a month or two away from election date. 
2) The magnitude of the cycles decreases with education, urbanization, level of 
democracy, transparency of the government, and freedom of media as well as over time. 
Thus, informational symmetries and maturity of democracy are important factors 
influencing cycles. 
3) The scale of pre-electoral manipulations increases popularity of incumbent governors 
and the probability to get re-elected. Freedom of regional media and the level of regional 
democracy reduce the positive effect of cycles on chances to get reelected. 
  We show why previous studies underestimated the cycle: quarterly frequency of 
data is insufficient: cycles are short-lived. In addition, our evidence is consistent with the 
                                                 
38 In developed democracies, voters actually punish politicians for unsound fiscal policies. See, for 
instance, Alesina, Perotti, and Tavares (1998) and Brender (2003).  
  25view that in a maturing democracy cycles disappear very fast, although, it could be the 
case that other institutional factors rather than learning reduced cycles in Russia. Over the 
seven years of Russia’s transition (considered in this paper) cycles became significantly 
smaller. 
Russian democracy is very young. Thus, the presence of cycles itself may be a 
good piece of news because it confirms that there is some electoral pressure on Russia’s 
governors (there would be no reason for pre-electoral manipulation if re-election of 
incumbent politicians were certain). Thus, so-called “administrative resource,” e.g., the 
ability to influence vote count, does not completely annihilate political incentives. Yet, 
we have shown that the optimal political strategy is to accumulate wage arrears in the 
public sector throughout the term and pay them out close to the election date. This has 
severe welfare implications in terms of consumption smoothing for the poor part of 
electorate (targeted by the cycle) since Russia’s financial markets are underdeveloped. If 
voters learn, however, which is consistent with the evidence, one could hope for 
increasingly more efficient response of Russian governors to political pressure. 
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  29Obs. Mean Median S.E. Min Max
Amplitude of the Cycle in:
Total Budget Expenditures 151 0.069 * 0.079 0.019 -0.724 0.648
Social Expenditures 153 0.186 * 0.126 0.035 -1.410 1.811
Education Expenditures 151 0.082 * 0.078 0.017 -0.591 0.508
Expenditures on Culture 150 0.065 * 0.111 0.028 -2.049 1.015
Healthcare Expenditures 150 0.083 * 0.115 0.024 -0.668 1.155
Media Expenditures 151 0.134 * 0.145 0.045 -2.095 1.658
Expenditures on Industry 146 0.194 * 0.255 0.064 -2.018 2.454
Ratio of Expenditures to Revenues 151 0.034 * 0.052 0.014 -0.542 0.580
Negative of Regional Wage Arrears 80 0.234 * 0.185 0.083 -2.078 2.938
Expenditures on Agriculture 145 0.044 -0.011 0.053 -1.423 1.552
Total Budget Revenues 153 0.039 0.027 0.021 -0.733 0.835
Negative of Tax Revenues 152 0.007 -0.019 0.019 -0.682 1.085
Table 1. Summary statistics for the constructed measures of the amplitude of the cycles























































































































































































































































































































































month –12 -0.022 0.026 0.01 6 0.01 3 0.006 0.048 -0.032 0.01 8 0.064* 0.066 0.050* 0.022 -0.047* * -0.01 5 0.02
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month –10 0.003 0.026 0.039* 0.025 0.033 0.1 33* * * -0.01 8 -0.1 61 * 0.032 0 .111** 0 .0 0 3 -0.024 -0.004 0.037* 0.01 3
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[4.07] [0.94] [3.12] [2.76] [2.91] [3.19] [1.40] [0.88] [2.99] [2.27] [3.74] [1.59] [1.22] [1.05] [2.83]
month +1 -0 .0 5 3 ** -0 .0 7 7 ** -0 .0 3 2 -0 .115 *** -0 .0 4 2 * -0 .10 4 ** -0 .17 6 ** -0 .0 5 5 -0 .0 2 8 -0.086** -0.058*** -0.043* * -0.008 -0.031 -0.026
[2.44] [2.28] [1.49] [4.44] [1.85] [2.20] [2.06] [0.73] [0.92] [2.05] [2.59] [2.20] [0.47] [1.52] [0.39]
month +2 -0.025 -0.023 -0.005 -0.021 -0.031 -0.043 -0.049 -0.205*** 0.002 -0.055 -0.008 -0.024 -0.007 -0.009 0.044
[1.17] [0.68] [0.24] [0.81] [1.40] [0.91] [0.57] [2.74] [0.07] [1.32] [0.37] [1.25] [0.41] [0.46] [0.67]
month +3 0.024 0.046 -0.004 -0.04 0.01 2 -0.052 0.092 -0.037 0.01 9 -0.06 0.016 -0.017 0.002 0.036* 0.004
[1.14] [1.38] [0.18] [1.56] [0.52] [1.11] [1.10] [0.50] [0.65] [1.46] [0.70] [0.89] [0.10] [1.80] [0.06]
month +4 -0.025 -0.002 -0.008 -0.031 0.003 -0.048 0.03 -0.051 0.002 0.01 3 -0.028 0.01 8 0.01 9 -0.02 -0.1 76* * *
[1.16] [0.05] [0.39] [1.22] [0.14] [1.03] [0.36] [0.70] [0.08] [0.31] [1.27] [0.93] [1.20] [1.01] [2.62]
month +5 0.03 0.053* 0.035* -0.01 1 0.01 8 0.02 -0.031 -0.01 8 0.026 0.01 8 -0.035 0 0.040* * 0.01 7 -0.084
[1.42] [1.65] [1.72] [0.42] [0.84] [0.43] [0.38] [0.25] [0.86] [0.45] [1.60] [0.02] [2.49] [0.85] [1.27]
month +6 -0.001 0.065* * 0.01 1 -0.047* -0.023 -0.053 0.01 7 0.049 0.052* -0.065 -0.029 0.002 0.037* * -0.007 0
[0.04] [2.03] [0.52] [1.91] [1.08] [1.14] [0.21] [0.69] [1.71] [1.57] [1.32] [0.09] [2.29] [0.36] [0.00]
month +7 0.006 -0.024 0.006 -0.021 0.01 6 -0.007 -0.053 -0.038 -0.01 3 0.008 0.009 0.031 * 0.005 -0.006 -0.03
[0.31] [0.76] [0.30] [0.85] [0.73] [0.15] [0.65] [0.55] [0.42] [0.19] [0.43] [1.68] [0.31] [0.30] [0.49]
month +8 0.004 0.025 0.002 -0.038 -0.009 -0.01 7 0.082 -0.05 0.01 9 -0.052 -0.024 -0.008 0.02 0.023 0.059
[0.18] [0.78] [0.08] [1.50] [0.40] [0.36] [1.01] [0.70] [0.61] [1.25] [1.11] [0.41] [1.25] [1.18] [1.00]
month +9 -0.01 5 0.007 -0.004 -0.038 -0.01 5 0.062 -0.025 0.001 0.01 3 0.056 -0.01 4 0.005 -0.007 -0.016 -0.04
[0.73] [0.22] [0.19] [1.51] [0.70] [1.34] [0.30] [0.01] [0.44] [1.37] [0.63] [0.25] [0.46] [0.80] [0.67]
month +10 0.002 0.051 -0.01 1 0.025 -0.01 1 0.009 0.01 5 0.026 0.035 -0.009 -0.026 -0.023 0.027* 0.01 1 0.028
[0.11] [1.58] [0.53] [1.00] [0.50] [0.20] [0.18] [0.35] [1.19] [0.22] [1.19] [1.22] [1.70] [0.57] [0.49]
month +11 0.02 0.035 0.01 3 0.076* * * 0.007 -0.046 -0.1 1 6 0.036 0.01 8 0.025 0.023 0.028 0.01 1 0.01 -0.071
[0.98] [1.09] [0.66] [3.03] [0.31] [1.01] [1.37] [0.51] [0.63] [0.62] [1.07] [1.49] [0.74] [0.51] [1.24]
month +12 -0.015 -0.011 0.028 -0.001 0.006 -0.016 -0.019 0.02 -0.007 0.04 -0.01 5 0.031 0.005 -0.026 -0.024
[0.71] [0.34] [1.38] [0.05] [0.26] [0.35] [0.23] [0.27] [0.25] [0.98] [0.70] [1.62] [0.34] [1.36] [0.42]
0.007 0.024* * 0.01 7* * 0.023* * * 0.032* * * -0.025 -0.006 0.01 6 0.01 -0.01 9 0.01 8* * 0.004 -0.01 4* * -0.001 -0.006
[0.98] [2.23] [2.48] [2.64] [4.37] [1.57] [0.20] [0.59] [0.97] [1.36] [2.31] [0.58] [2.40] [0.13] [0.24]
0.024 -0.029 0.036 0.021 0.01 1 -0.052 0.021 0.1 2 -0.026 -0.064 0.041 0.072* * -0.039 -0.056 0.1 47
[0.67] [0.60] [1.19] [0.56] [0.33] [0.65] [0.16] [1.14] [0.51] [0.91] [1.27] [2.51] [1.48] [1.64] [0.96]
Lag -1 0 .19 1*** 0 .19 8 *** 0 .115 *** 0 .18 5 *** 0 .18 3 *** 0 .12 8 *** 0 .3 0 0 *** 0 .16 6 *** 0 .2 0 3 *** 0.1 07* * * 0.21 0* * * 0 .2 17 *** -0 .0 2 0 .13 3 *** 0 .16 0 ***
[1 5.60] [1 6.45] [9.48] [1 5.1 7] [1 5.08] [1 0.39] [22.84] [1 2.43] [1 6.1 5] [8.34] [1 6.93] [1 7.90] [1 .50] [1 0.48] [1 0.56]
Lag -2 0 .111*** 0 .19 0 *** 0 .0 9 1*** 0 .12 2 *** 0 .10 4 *** 0 .0 7 5 *** 0 .13 9 *** 0 .0 8 9 *** 0 .15 2 *** 0 .0 8 6 *** 0 .16 1*** 0 .16 3 *** 0 .0 7 5 *** 0 .12 7 *** 0 .13 8 ***
[9.08] [1 5.52] [7.51 ] [9.92] [8.49] [6.06] [1 0.20] [6.52] [1 1 .91 ] [6.77] [1 2.92] [1 3.45] [5.64] [1 0.08] [9.29]
Lag -3 0 .15 4 *** 0 .111*** 0 .13 1*** 0 .118 *** 0 .12 5 *** 0 .10 4 *** 0 .0 8 9 *** 0 .10 9 *** 0 .13 2 *** 0 .0 9 9 *** 0 .15 2 *** 0 .2 2 5 *** 0 .0 7 3 *** 0 .12 2 *** 0 .113 ***
[1 2.59] [9.1 5] [1 0.88] [9.66] [1 0.26] [8.43] [6.58] [8.1 1 ] [1 0.34] [7.76] [1 2.23] [1 8.78] [5.46] [9.82] [7.89]
Lag -4 0 .12 4 *** 0 .0 9 7 *** 0 .0 7 3 *** 0 .0 6 6 *** 0 .0 9 2 *** 0 .0 7 3 *** 0 .0 5 3 *** 0 .0 4 9 *** 0 .0 8 9 *** 0 .0 7 4 *** 0 .119 *** 0.050* * * 0.005 0.043* * * 0.075* * *
[10.29] [8.25] [6.20] [5.63] [7.83] [5.95] [4.14] [3.70] [7.10] [5.82] [9.68] [4.19] [0.35] [3.45] [5.23]
Constant -0 .0 2 7 -0 .0 8 3 *** -0 .0 0 7 -0 .0 4 4 ** -0 .0 5 6 *** -0 .2 13 *** -0 .2 5 4 *** -0 .2 9 5 *** -0 .0 6 5 ** -0.089** -0.048*** -0 .119 *** 0 .0 2 1 0 .0 9 1*** 0 .12 8 *
[1.48] [3.27] [0.43] [2.21] [3.29] [5.12] [3.78] [5.18] [2.44] [2.44] [2.79] [7.74] [1.54] [5.25] [1.68]
Obs. 6767 7004 6989 6921 6966 6600 5825 5775 6388 6241 6498 7060 591 6 6437 41 1 5
# of regions 86 86 86 86 86 86 86 86 86 86 86 86 86 86 86
R2 0.1 63 0.204 0.074 0.1 23 0.1 22 0.066 0.203 0.078 0.1 68 0.058 0.21 6 0.242 0.02 0.081 0.1 2
 Table 2. Political budget cycle
Note: All dependent variables are de-trended and in logs. They are measured in real terms per capita. Absolute values of t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, ** 
and * denote significance at 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. Regional Fixed effects included.
month 0 - 
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-0.002 0.001 0.002 0.087 0.017**
[0.12] [0.55] [0.38] [0.96] [2.15]
-0.005 0.000 0.000 0.045 -0.009
[0.36] [0.15] [0.07] [0.50] [1.07]
-0.001 0.001 -0.007 0.068 0.012
[0.07] [0.37] [1.37] [0.92] [1.43]
-0.007 -0.001 0.002 -0.008 0.011
[0.59] [0.91] [0.34] [0.11] [1.38]
-0.031** 0.000 -0.003 -0.009 -0.015*
[2.42] [0.00] [0.56] [0.12] [1.83]
0.004 -0.001 0.003 0.039 -0.015*
[0.32] [0.93] [0.52] [0.55] [1.95]
-0.006 -0.003** -0.002 0.062 -0.011
[0.45] [1.99] [0.47] [0.88] [1.45]
0.007 -0.001 -0.003 -0.019 -0.020**
[0.60] [0.88] [0.64] [0.27] [2.54]
0.000 -0.002* 0.011** 0.021 0.001
[0.01] [1.77] [2.27] [0.31] [0.16]
0.016 -0.002 0.002 0.028 0.003
[1.32] [1.52] [0.49] [0.40] [0.33]
0.013 -0.001 0.006 -0.060 0.030***
[1.05] [0.83] [1.17] [0.84] [3.73]
0.001 -0.003* 0.018*** -0.225*** 0.057***
[0.09] [1.75] [3.51] [2.87] [7.00]
0.004 -0.004*** 0.002 -0.105 0.055***
[0.31] [2.71] [0.42] [1.37] [6.81]
-0.015 0.000 -0.005 0.091 -0.016*
[1.13] [0.15] [0.93] [1.22] [1.93]
0.008 -0.001 -0.004 0.136* -0.011
[0.55] [0.77] [0.82] [1.88] [1.40]
0.010 0.001 -0.011** 0.098 0.002
[0.72] [0.98] [2.19] [1.40] [0.19]
0.003 0.000 -0.009* 0.097 0.006
[0.20] [0.15] [1.71] [1.40] [0.75]
0.010 -0.001 -0.003 0.023 -0.009
[0.72] [0.35] [0.53] [0.34] [1.12]
0.012 0.000 -0.003 0.081 0.011
[0.84] [0.04] [0.60] [1.17] [1.34]
0.008 -0.001 -0.008 0.012 -0.008
[0.56] [0.46] [1.60] [0.17] [0.96]
-0.016 -0.002 0.003 0.060 -0.012
[1.16] [1.56] [0.55] [0.86] [1.45]
0.004 0.000 -0.001 0.109 -0.005
[0.31] [0.00] [0.22] [1.59] [0.61]
-0.003 0.000 0.000 0.031 -0.006
[0.24] [0.24] [0.03] [0.38] [0.74]
0.007 0.003* 0.003 -0.103 0.004
[0.53] [1.84] [0.62] [1.16] [0.48]
-0.013 -0.001 0.001 -0.080 0.052***
[1.00] [0.54] [0.19] [0.90] [6.43]
-0.001 -0.001** 0.004*** -0.009 -0.004
[0.30] [2.08] [3.05] [0.25] [1.64]
Left -0.016 0.000 -0.009 0.000 -0.021**
[1.22] [0.15] [1.58] [.] [2.40]
Lag -1 -0.411*** 0.073*** 0.464*** 0.420*** 0.401***
[33.96] [7.69] [41.29] [22.37] [35.67]
Lag -2 -0.184*** -0.055*** 0.115*** 0.200*** 0.193***
[14.20] [5.92] [9.32] [9.90] [16.03]
Lag -3 -0.117*** -0.025*** 0.161*** 0.148*** 0.101***
[9.12] [2.70] [12.99] [7.25] [8.39]
Lag -4 -0.061*** 0.011 0.055*** 0.050*** 0.071***
[5.17] [1.22] [4.88] [2.60] [6.42]
0.008 0.001 -0.016*** -0.089 -0.035***
[1.04] [1.57] [5.09] [1.39] [7.26]
Observations 6944 10749 7970 2767 8002
# of regions 86 86 86 85 86
R2 0.148 0.013 0.487 0.493 0.447
month +12
Constant
Note: All dependent variables are in logs and de-trended. All except inflation and 
prices are measured in real terms per capita. Absolute values of t-statistics are in 
parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at 1, 5 and 10% level, 

















 Table 3. Cycles in wages, wage arrears and economic outcomes 





















-0.157*** -0.171*** -0.165*** -0.164*** -0.159*** -0.035*** -0.037*** -0.035*** -0.036*** -0.035*** -0.050*** -0.057*** -0.053*** -0.053*** -0.052***
[4.34] [4.74] [4.55] [4.57] [4.41] [4.23] [4.52] [4.25] [4.30] [4.18] [2.83] [3.16] [2.96] [2.95] [2.88]
1.349*** 1.485*** 1.461*** 1.722*** 1.365*** 0.378*** 0.404*** 0.389*** 0.460*** 0.378*** 0.598*** 0.679*** 0.647*** 0.843*** 0.621***
[4.27] [4.62] [4.53] [4.08] [4.29] [5.34] [5.60] [5.29] [4.50] [5.21] [3.70] [4.07] [3.86] [3.40] [3.75]
Observations 132 133 133 133 132 139 140 140 140 139 140 141 141 141 140
R
2











-0.025*** -0.028*** -0.026*** -0.027*** -0.026*** -0.034*** -0.039*** -0.037*** -0.037*** -0.036*** -0.033*** -0.036*** -0.035*** -0.034*** -0.033***
[3.02] [3.28] [3.08] [3.19] [3.09] [2.88] [3.34] [3.15] [3.15] [3.07] [3.10] [3.37] [3.28] [3.24] [3.12]
0.307*** 0.324*** 0.268*** 0.304*** 0.309*** 0.385*** 0.427*** 0.424*** 0.472*** 0.399*** 0.363*** 0.396*** 0.386*** 0.381*** 0.366***
[4.23] [4.41] [3.18] [3.25] [4.25] [3.84] [4.39] [4.27] [4.24] [4.02] [4.06] [4.25] [4.23] [3.23] [4.05]
Observations 139 140 140 140 139 139 140 140 140 139 139 140 140 140 139
R
2
0.106 0.081 0.091 0.079 0.075 0.100 0.097 0.096 0.082 0.107 0.086 0.091 0.082 0.078 0.075
Index of freedom of mass media
Government transparency
healthcare expenditures
Note: Absolute values of t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. Standard errors are robust and adjusted for clusters within regions.
Share of urban population





social expenditures total budgetary expenditures
Time
Constant
Index of freedom of mass media
Table 4. Determinants of the magnitude of the budget cycle, cross-section 
Amplitude of the cycles in:
education expenditures expenditures on culture
Amplitude of the cycles in:
Share of population with higher 
education
Share of urban population
The first component of amplitudes of the cycles in six fiscal 








































































































































































































































































































































































































































Month -3*X 0.165* 0.022 -0.051 0.101 0.056 -0.063 0.024 -0.005 -0.043 0.029 -0.026 -0.027 0.001 0.002 0.001 -0.010 -0.010 0.020
[1.91] [0.16] [0.40] [1.15] [0.44] [0.56] [0.95] [0.13] [1.25] [1.24] [0.74] [0.82] [0.44] [0.71] [0.29] [1.06] [0.72] [1.38]
Month -2*X -0.183** -0.302** -0.067 -0.080 -0.156 -0.172 -0.024 -0.037 -0.032 -0.032 -0.048 -0.014 -0.003 -0.005** -0.004 -0.017* -0.014 0.001
[2.10] [2.29] [0.54] [0.86] [1.17] [1.46] [0.95] [0.99] [0.94] [1.39] [1.37] [0.46] [1.63] [2.00] [1.64] [1.82] [0.96] [0.08]
Month -1*X -0.122 -0.039 -0.057 0.065 -0.183 -0.248** 0.003 -0.091** -0.079** -0.010 -0.106*** -0.054* 0.000 -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.038*** -0.059*** -0.031**
[1.34] [0.29] [0.41] [0.70] [1.37] [2.07] [0.12] [2.31] [2.16] [0.40] [2.89] [1.65] [0.09] [3.34] [3.61] [3.45] [3.64] [2.04]
Month 0*X -0.034 -0.135 -0.204 0.047 0.000 -0.269** -0.055** -0.023 -0.016 -0.009 0.029 0.033 -0.005*** -0.003 -0.001 -0.017 -0.007 0.025*
[0.38] [0.99] [1.49] [0.52] [0.00] [2.23] [2.01] [0.59] [0.43] [0.39] [0.79] [1.00] [2.94] [1.14] [0.58] [1.51] [0.43] [1.68]
Month -3 0.013 0.029 -0.025 0.012 0.038 -0.013 -0.057 0.044 0.107 0.012 0.031 -0.021 0.019 0.033 -0.022 0.006 0.035 -0.021
[0.62] [0.91] [0.85] [0.53] [1.16] [0.44] [0.74] [0.37] [0.98] [0.56] [0.95] [0.71] [0.88] [1.00] [0.73] [0.29] [1.07] [0.67]
Month -2 0.045** 0.079** 0.050* 0.051** 0.095*** 0.076** 0.117 0.193* 0.153 0.047** 0.084*** 0.057* 0.053** 0.089*** 0.060** 0.039* 0.086*** 0.070**
[2.15] [2.49] [1.70] [2.32] [2.89] [2.51] [1.50] [1.65] [1.42] [2.22] [2.62] [1.92] [2.46] [2.75] [2.01] [1.77] [2.61] [2.29]
Month -1 0.109*** 0.260*** 0.141*** 0.106*** 0.259*** 0.131*** 0.097 0.524*** 0.369*** 0.107*** 0.252*** 0.131*** 0.113*** 0.263*** 0.142*** 0.082*** 0.223*** 0.112***
[5.01] [7.86] [4.60] [4.58] [7.58] [4.20] [1.18] [4.31] [3.25] [4.81] [7.55] [4.28] [5.05] [7.87] [4.63] [3.48] [6.40] [3.52]
Month 0 -0.064*** 0.014 0.064** -0.069*** 0.022 0.091*** 0.104 0.086 0.113 -0.060*** 0.017 0.067** -0.058*** 0.019 0.068** -0.061*** 0.026 0.096***
[2.97] [0.42] [2.14] [3.02] [0.64] [2.98] [1.23] [0.71] [1.00] [2.74] [0.51] [2.26] [2.60] [0.58] [2.29] [2.60] [0.77] [3.09]
Month +1 -0.048** -0.090*** -0.047 -0.043* -0.087*** -0.035 -0.039* -0.096*** -0.047 -0.039* -0.096*** -0.047 -0.039* -0.097*** -0.047 -0.030 -0.079** -0.034
[2.23] [2.76] [1.62] [1.91] [2.61] [1.18] [1.78] [2.93] [1.59] [1.79] [2.94] [1.60] [1.79] [2.96] [1.59] [1.32] [2.37] [1.13]
Month +2 -0.047** -0.044 -0.020 -0.032 -0.033 -0.006 -0.042* -0.042 -0.017 -0.042* -0.042 -0.017 -0.042* -0.048 -0.021 -0.020 -0.026 -0.004
[2.19] [1.33] [0.66] [1.46] [0.99] [0.19] [1.95] [1.28] [0.57] [1.95] [1.29] [0.57] [1.93] [1.46] [0.71] [0.89] [0.78] [0.14]
Month +3 0.003 0.006 -0.014 0.011 0.036 0.012 0.011 0.020 -0.003 0.011 0.020 -0.003 0.011 0.014 -0.007 0.022 0.042 0.013
[0.12] [0.19] [0.48] [0.48] [1.09] [0.40] [0.50] [0.61] [0.10] [0.50] [0.61] [0.10] [0.52] [0.42] [0.26] [0.99] [1.27] [0.43]
Left 0.015 -0.030 -0.029 0.010 -0.029 -0.017 0.014 -0.029 -0.027 0.013 -0.030 -0.030 0.014 -0.028 -0.026 0.015 -0.028 -0.028
[0.48] [0.66] [0.58] [0.32] [0.59] [0.34] [0.44] [0.62] [0.55] [0.42] [0.65] [0.61] [0.45] [0.60] [0.53] [0.46] [0.57] [0.55]
Term in power 0.027*** 0.024** 0.019* 0.031*** 0.021** 0.008 0.027*** 0.022** 0.017* 0.027*** 0.023** 0.018* 0.028*** 0.022** 0.015 0.000 0.005 0.004
[3.94] [2.32] [1.93] [4.42] [2.00] [0.80] [3.89] [2.14] [1.73] [3.93] [2.20] [1.77] [4.06] [2.14] [1.55] [0.01] [0.34] [0.28]
lag1 0.172*** 0.216*** 0.210*** 0.183*** 0.198*** 0.202*** 0.180*** 0.205*** 0.210*** 0.179*** 0.205*** 0.211*** 0.180*** 0.206*** 0.206*** 0.178*** 0.198*** 0.205***
[13.60] [17.22] [16.07] [15.11] [16.49] [16.10] [14.45] [16.55] [16.21] [14.39] [16.56] [16.27] [14.60] [16.76] [16.07] [14.70] [16.47] [16.27]
lag2 0.103*** 0.189*** 0.157*** 0.104*** 0.190*** 0.152*** 0.096*** 0.193*** 0.156*** 0.096*** 0.193*** 0.157*** 0.096*** 0.189*** 0.154*** 0.101*** 0.189*** 0.152***
[8.03] [14.74] [11.84] [8.50] [15.55] [11.92] [7.62] [15.26] [11.88] [7.64] [15.29] [11.91] [7.72] [15.09] [11.80] [8.31] [15.49] [11.88]
lag3 0.140*** 0.109*** 0.122*** 0.125*** 0.112*** 0.132*** 0.143*** 0.111*** 0.118*** 0.143*** 0.112*** 0.118*** 0.137*** 0.117*** 0.128*** 0.122*** 0.112*** 0.132***
[11.02] [8.47] [9.27] [10.26] [9.21] [10.39] [11.41] [8.78] [9.04] [11.43] [8.85] [9.05] [11.09] [9.33] [9.92] [10.03] [9.24] [10.37]
lag4 0.098*** 0.098*** 0.077*** 0.092*** 0.097*** 0.089*** 0.086*** 0.094*** 0.079*** 0.085*** 0.094*** 0.078*** 0.094*** 0.097*** 0.079*** 0.089*** 0.098*** 0.090***
[7.82] [7.87] [5.93] [7.81] [8.30] [7.14] [7.06] [7.79] [6.19] [7.05] [7.76] [6.13] [7.87] [8.10] [6.24] [7.62] [8.34] [7.19]
Time 0.012*** 0.008** 0.001
[5.39] [2.33] [0.38]
Constant -0.091*** -0.101*** -0.059** -0.053*** -0.069*** -0.058** -0.066*** -0.086*** -0.062** -0.066*** -0.086*** -0.061** -0.066*** -0.082*** -0.058** -0.015 -0.049* -0.048*
[5.74] [4.16] [2.34] [3.26] [2.81] [2.24] [4.16] [3.59] [2.46] [4.16] [3.60] [2.42] [4.20] [3.46] [2.31] [0.84] [1.77] [1.68]
Observations 6389 6410 5946 6966 7004 6388 6600 6593 6063 6600 6593 6063 6682 6671 6159 6966 7004 6388
Number of regions 76 76 76 86 86 86 80 80 80 80 80 80 81 81 81 86 86 86
R-squared 0.125 0.218 0.166 0.121 0.202 0.168 0.121 0.209 0.163 0.121 0.209 0.162 0.124 0.215 0.165 0.125 0.203 0.168
Table 5. Determinants of the magniture of the budget cycle,  panel estimation
Democracy Government transparency Time
Note: All dependent variables are de-trended and in logs. The are measured in real terms per capita. Absolute values of t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at 1,5, and 10% level, respectively. 
Regional fixed effects included.
Share of educated population Freedom of mass media Share of urban population


























































































































































































































































































































































0.338** 0.291* 0.353** 0.289* 0.310** 0.268* 0.311** 0.241* 0.340** 0.251*
[2.36] [1.89] [2.46] [1.84] [2.34] [1.72] [2.36] [1.65] [2.43] [1.76]
-0.458 0.296 -0.249 0.367 -0.016** -0.003 -0.455* -0.357 0.007 -0.188
[0.89] [0.52] [0.32] [0.43] [2.36] [0.36] [1.70] [0.91] [0.05] [0.99]
0.074 0.061 0.065 0.069 0.056 0.049 0.073 0.068 0.073 0.076
[1.05] [1.04] [0.98] [1.11] [0.96] [0.90] [1.04] [1.15] [1.02] [1.25]
0.672 0.207 1.107** 0.733 0.023*** 0.016* -0.133 -0.077 -0.057 -0.036
[1.37] [0.38] [2.11] [1.37] [3.21] [1.71] [0.59] [0.29] [0.45] [0.29]
0.170*** 0.188*** 0.183*** 0.202*** 0.175*** 0.199*** 0.157*** 0.186*** 0.152** 0.187***
[3.12] [2.74] [3.23] [2.98] [3.34] [3.03] [2.75] [2.77] [2.61] [2.82]
-0.842*** -0.892*** -0.814*** -0.828*** -0.821*** -0.836*** -0.918*** -0.895*** -0.937*** -0.902***
[3.77] [4.25] [3.70] [4.00] [4.06] [4.02] [4.20] [4.14] [4.13] [4.16]
Relative Share of 0.009 0.158 0.08 0.144 0.006 0.119 -0.171 -0.02 -0.1 -0.074
Soc. Exp. [0.02] [0.33] [0.16] [0.30] [0.01] [0.24] [0.33] [0.04] [0.17] [0.16]
1.595 1.095 1.456 1.049 1.653 1.029 1.277 0.89 1.2 0.894
[1.31] [0.96] [1.24] [0.99] [1.43] [0.96] [1.05] [0.83] [0.97] [0.84]
0.758 1.657 0.184 1.591 0.408 1.635 -0.801 1.065 -0.76 0.517
[0.22] [0.47] [0.05] [0.49] [0.13] [0.51] [0.21] [0.32] [0.19] [0.15]
0.841*** 0.826*** 0.831*** 0.879*** 0.888***
[5.03] [4.66] [4.98] [4.94] [4.87]
Observations 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120
R








Note: Absolute values of t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. Standard errors are robust and adjusted for clusters within 
regions.
Table 6. Effect of cycles on probability to get re-elected
Share of population with 
higher education
Share of urban 
population
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Figure 1. Elections and actual series of regional per capital social expenditures (smoothed by a moving average)  
Social expenditures per capita in Vologodskaya 
Oblast, US$




























































































































































































Social expenditures per capita in Kemerovskaya Oblast, 
US$






























































































































































































Social expenditures per capita in 
Republic of Chuvashiya, US$






























































































































































































Social expenditures per capita in 
Magadanskaya Oblast, US$
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Panel A. Descriptive statistics of policy instruments and outcomes
Variable No. of obs. Mean Median S.E. Min Max Source Units Time span
Total budget expenditures 7370 45.073 26.918 0.717 5.787 606.158 MF $ per capita Mar, 1996 - Jul, 2003
Social expenditures 7522 2.905 2.102 0.035 0.183 29.365 MF $ per capita Jan, 1996 - Jul, 2003
Share of social expenditures 7244 7.827 7.301 0.044 1.168 29.834 MF % Jan, 1996 - Jul, 2003
Education expenditures 7528 9.284 6.115 0.118 1.287 89.396 MF $ per capita Jan, 1996 - Jul, 2003
Expenditures on culture 7512 1.065 0.682 0.015 0.124 11.314 MF $ per capita Jan, 1996 - Jul, 2003
Healthcare expenditures 7524 5.949 4.122 0.070 0.828 50.709 MF $ per capita Jan, 1996 - Jul, 2003
Media expenditures 7332 0.180 0.081 0.004 0.002 3.511 MF $ per capita Mar, 1996 - Jul, 2003
Share of media expenditures 7210 0.372 0.301 0.003 0.024 1.762 MF % Mar, 1996 - Jul, 2003
Expenditures on industry 7181 2.234 0.490 0.084 0.000 90.903 MF $ per capita Jan, 1996 - Jul, 2003
Expenditures on agriculture 7067 1.616 0.845 0.029 0.000 23.305 MF $ per capita Jan, 1996 - Jul, 2003
Total budget revenues 7355 45.347 27.303 0.707 5.848 519.078 MF $ per capita Jan, 1996 - Jul, 2003
Tax revenues 7542 25.755 16.716 0.392 1.540 320.622 MF $ per capita Jan, 1996 - Jul, 2003
Ratio of expenditures to revenues 7094 100.102 98.469 0.283 43.474 266.375 MF % Mar, 1996 - Jul, 2003
Growth 7826 0.000278 0.000501 0.000289 -0.175 0.155 GKS % Feb, 1995 - Jul, 2003
Inflation 11246 0.195 0.124 0.002 -0.180 1.677 GKS % Feb, 1992 - Jul, 2003
Regional wage arrears 3870 0.006378 0.001187 0.000354 0.000 0.246 GKS $ per capita Jan, 1999 - Jul, 2003
Wage level 8410 164.614 131.095 1.135 48.215 671.721 GKS $ per capita Feb, 1995 - Jul, 2003
Money income 8463 125.242 102.647 0.830 31.997 566.026 GKS $ per capita Jan, 1995 - Jul, 2003
Panel B. Descriptive statistics of elections
Variable No. of obs. Mean Median S.E. Min Max
Dummy for participation of incumbents in elections 214 0.90 1 0.02 0 1
Dummy for incumbents’ win in elections 192 0.65 1 0.03 0 1
Dummy for incumbent coming the third or worse in elections 192 0.06 0 0.02 0 1
% of votes pro incumbent 192 53.98 56.23 1.65 4.76 99.9
% of votes pro main competitor of incumbent 181 32.30 28.50 1.55 0.71 82
% of votes pro winner 214 62.28 59.28 1.03 23.5 99.9
% of votes pro the first runner up 202 24.09 24.23 0.91 0.71 48
Number of candidates 214 5.69 5 0.20 1 16
Variable Regions Mean Median S.E. Min Max
Log of education in 1995 76 2.78 2.75 0.03 2.19 3.68
Log of share of urban population 86 4.17 4.23 0.03 2.91 4.61
Index of freedom of media production 81 36.25 37 1.59 0 75
Index of democracy 77 2.96 3 0.10 1 5
Index of government transparency 77 2.99 3 0.11 1 5
Panel C. Descriptive statistics of proxies for awareness, government transparency, and democracy
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